Between Two Chants, What Do the People Really Want?

In the early hours of December 17 buses began arriving in Tunis from across the country–Tataouine, Zarzis, Sidi Bouzid, Kairouan, Djerba. The busses carried demonstrators who waved Tunisian flags and held portraits of President Kais Saied. Tunisia’s downtown once again became a stage for political expression. Estimates of around 2000 of the President’s supporters made their way to Habib Bourguiba Avenue downtown to mark Revolution Day and reaffirm their support for the head of state.

“The people want Saied again;” “Tunisia is free, traitors out” were some of the slogans the crowds chanted on Wednesday. The gathering was more than a commemoration. It sent a clear political message. Slogans, banners, and chants called for a new presidential mandate for Saied. They also targeted political opponents, accusing them of betraying the country and calling for life prison sentences, framing political dissent as a threat to national unity. The tone was confrontational, reflecting a deep polarization that has come to define Tunisia’s political landscape in recent years.

December 17 marks the day in 2010 that fruit seller Mohamed Bouazizi set himself on fire in Sidi Bouzid , an act of protest that ignited the revolution and led to the fall of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s regime by January 14, 2011. In the early years after the uprising, national commemorations were held on January 14th, but President Saied and his supporters favor December 17th as the start of an unfinished revolution that they see as having been hijacked by corrupt political parties. So, fifteen years later, the meaning of the revolution appears still, or perhaps even increasingly contested. For Saied’s supporters, the president embodies a continuation, or even a “correction”, of the revolutionary path, framed as a struggle against corruption, political elites, and what they see as a failed democratic transition. For others, the same revolution is invoked to denounce what they describe as “authoritarian backsliding” and the concentration of power in the hands of one man.

Wednesday’s demonstration comes at a time of particularly heightened political tension. In recent weeks, opposition groups and activists have organized protests demanding Kais Saied’s impeachment, chanting, “The people want the fall of the regime,” a slogan that directly recalls the uprising against Ben Ali. The contrast between these two mobilizations is striking. In the same country, under the same revolutionary legacy, two opposing crowds invoke the “people” to demand completely opposite political outcomes.

This raises a fundamental question, what do “the people” really want?Saied’s supporters often present themselves as a sort of silent majority, claiming to represent Tunisians who feel abandoned by political parties, parliament, and years of economic stagnation. For many of them, Saied’s exceptional measures since July 25, 2021—including the dissolution of parliament, the concentration of executive and legislative powers, and legal actions against the Ennahdha party and its leader Rached Ghannouchi—are seen as necessary steps to restore order and dignity. Their chants against the opposition reflect deep resentment toward political actors associated with the post-2011 period, widely blamed for corruption, instability, and unfulfilled promises.

However, the calls to label opponents as traitors and to impose life prison sentences reveal a troubling dimension of this political moment. The labeling of the opposition reflects Saied’s own discourse against his critics, in which he frequently adopts a conspiratorial narrative and an accusatory discourse portraying opponents as enemies. Political disagreement is no longer framed as part of democratic debate, but increasingly as a moral or patriotic faultline. Journalists, booksellers, judges, lawyers and civil society activists in particular have raised warnings about this atmosphere narrowing the space for pluralism and further stigmatizing dissent.

 Opposition groups who still protest highlight growing fears about the erosion of democratic institutions, judicial independence, and civil liberties. Activists argue that the concentration of power contradicts the very goals of the revolution, which demanded freedom, accountability, and popular sovereignty. For them, the slogan “The people want the fall of the regime” is not a rejection of the state, but a rejection of what they see as a new form of authoritarianism.

Yet both camps claim to speak in the name of the people, while large segments of Tunisian society remain absent from the streets altogether. Economic hardship, unemployment, inflation, and deteriorating public services continue to dominate daily life. Many Tunisians are disengaged, disillusioned, or simply exhausted, watching political confrontations unfold without seeing tangible improvements in their living conditions.

The mobilization of Saied’s supporters on December 17 demonstrates that the president still commands loyalty and symbolic capital, particularly among those who view him as an outsider fighting entrenched interests. At the same time, the persistence of opposition protests shows that resistance to his rule remains strong and organized. Rather than offering clarity, these competing demonstrations expose a fragmented political reality where legitimacy is constantly contested.

Fifteen years after the revolution, Tunisia finds itself caught between two chants, both invoking the people, both claiming revolutionary legitimacy, and pointing in opposite directions. The question is no longer only who speaks louder in the streets, but whether the political system can create space for dialogue, accountability, and genuine representation beyond slogans. Until that question is addressed, the meaning of December 17 will remain deeply divided, reflecting a revolution still searching for its outcome.

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